Oil · Ships · Promises · Repeat.Mon, Oct 19, 2026 · Every number sourced · Show me the receipts

A running ledger of the Iran war.

Real sources. Real numbers. Same mess.

EST. DAY 1FEB 28, 2026

IS THIS OVER YET?

NO.

DAY OF WAR

Counting Feb 28, 2026 as Day 1 · US Central Command + White House

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.days_at_war
D2. day_number = 2026-10-19 − 2026-02-28 + 1, calendar days in America/New_York. Day 1 anchored to the WAR_START record.
inputs (1): evt-2026-02-28-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Is Hormuz open?

NO.

4.1 ships a day. Normal is 85.

Each box is one ship on a normal day. We filled in the ones that showed up.

OBSERVED DERIVED IMF PortWatch · 7-day mean to Oct 11 · 4.9% of normal

211 of 226 PortWatch days since Day 1 under 25% of normal

Status CLOSED · series: IMF PortWatch · n_total · chokepoint6 · data through 2026-10-11

How this is computed
derived.hormuz_status
M8. ratio = mean(hormuz.transits_daily, the 7 calendar days 2026-10-05..2026-10-11 ending at the latest PortWatch date; 7 with data) ÷ hormuz.transits_baseline (84.8, mean n_total over the pre-war window). Bands: ≥ 0.75 OPEN; ≥ 0.25 RESTRICTED; ≥ 0.05 MOSTLY CLOSED; below that CLOSED. Display: RESTRICTED and MOSTLY CLOSED → "NOT REALLY.", CLOSED → "NO.", OPEN → "YES.".
inputs (8): hormuz.transits_baseline:2026-02-27, hormuz.transits_daily:2026-10-05 … 2026-10-11 (7 daily records)
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.hormuz_transits_7d_mean
M8. Mean of hormuz.transits_daily over 2026-10-05..2026-10-11 (7 days with data). Rounded to 0.1.
inputs (8): hormuz.transits_baseline:2026-02-27, hormuz.transits_daily:2026-10-05 … 2026-10-11 (7 daily records)
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.hormuz_pct_normal
M8. ratio = mean(hormuz.transits_daily, the 7 calendar days 2026-10-05..2026-10-11 ending at the latest PortWatch date; 7 with data) ÷ hormuz.transits_baseline (84.8, mean n_total over the pre-war window). × 100, rounded to 0.1.
inputs (8): hormuz.transits_baseline:2026-02-27, hormuz.transits_daily:2026-10-05 … 2026-10-11 (7 daily records)
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.hormuz_days_below_25pct
M8. Count of PortWatch days from 2026-02-28 to 2026-10-11 (226 days with data) where n_total ÷ baseline < 0.25.
inputs (227): hormuz.transits_baseline:2026-02-27, hormuz.transits_daily:2026-02-28 … 2026-10-11 (226 daily records)
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.hormuz_days_below_10pct
M8. Count of PortWatch days from 2026-02-28 to 2026-10-11 (226 days with data) where n_total ÷ baseline < 0.1.
inputs (227): hormuz.transits_baseline:2026-02-27, hormuz.transits_daily:2026-02-28 … 2026-10-11 (226 daily records)
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.hormuz_missing_transits
M8. Σ max(0, baseline − n_total) over PortWatch days from 2026-02-28 to 2026-10-11 (226 days with data), baseline 84.8/day. Rounded to a whole transit. Days PortWatch has not published yet are not counted.
inputs (227): hormuz.transits_baseline:2026-02-27, hormuz.transits_daily:2026-02-28 … 2026-10-11 (226 daily records)
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Is there a deal?

NOT CLOSE.

Last “very close”: 76 days ago.

SAID
Oct 18: Araghchi says Iran's seven-day Hormuz reopening proposal is "still on the table"; sequencing dispute with Washington unresolved
IN FORCE
None observed holding. No formal termination on record.
Declared vs. observed vs. disputed
Two-week ceasefire (Pakistan-mediated):
Declared: superseded (the Islamabad Memorandum, Jun 17) · Observed: violated May 7 · Disputed
Two-week ceasefire (Pakistan-mediated) · declared basis:
The signed Islamabad Memorandum set a new 60-day ceasefire. The two-week ceasefire was never declared over by either side; supersession is dated to the signing (the Jun 14 deal announcement was not implemented by Iran until signing). Approximate by design.
Two-week ceasefire (Pakistan-mediated) · observed basis:
Iranian forces attacked three U.S. destroyers transiting Hormuz; U.S. forces struck launch sites near Bandar Abbas and Qeshm. Trump said the same day the ceasefire was "in effect".
Indefinite ceasefire extension:
Declared: superseded (the Islamabad Memorandum, Jun 17) · Observed: violated May 25 · Disputed
Indefinite ceasefire extension · declared basis:
Never declared over by either side. Supersession is dated to the Jun 17 signing of the Islamabad Memorandum (the deal was announced Jun 14 but Iran said it would not implement before signing); the true handover falls somewhere in Jun 12–17.
Indefinite ceasefire extension · observed basis:
CENTCOM struck Iranian mine-laying boats and missile launch sites near Bandar Abbas, calling it self-defense "while using restraint during the ongoing ceasefire"; Iran called it a "grave violation of the ceasefire."
Islamabad Memorandum:
Declared: claimed over by Trump (Jul 8); suspended by Iran (Jul 13); lapsed (60-day window, no extension, Aug 17); no formal termination on record · Observed: collapsed Jul 7–8 · Disputed
Islamabad Memorandum · declared basis:
Sixty days after signing passed with no extension and no wider deal. Not declared by either party; Iran's Baqaei said the memorandum "contains no provision regarding a 60-day period." Recorded as lapsed under the reported terms, with the expiry itself disputed.
Islamabad Memorandum · observed basis:
After Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in Hormuz, the U.S. struck about 80 Iranian targets on Jul 7 and about 90 more on Jul 8; IRGC attacked U.S. sites in Bahrain and Kuwait. Sustained two-way strikes, not an isolated incident.
Doha stand-down (informal):
Declared: claimed over by Trump (Jul 8); no formal termination on record · Observed: collapsed Jul 7–8 · Disputed
Doha stand-down (informal) · declared basis:
No formal end was announced for the stand-down. Trump's Jul 8 "As far as I'm concerned, it's over" (asked about the ceasefire and the MOU) covers it in practice; recorded as claimed_over, not terminated.
Doha stand-down (informal) · observed basis:
Two nights of U.S. strikes (about 80 then about 90 Iranian targets) after Iranian attacks on commercial vessels, and IRGC attacks on U.S. sites in Bahrain and Kuwait.
Rule:
M13. Three separate tracks, entries dated on or before asOf only: declared = latest party declaration (in_force|extended|suspended|terminated|superseded|lapsed|claimed_over); observed = latest evidence entry (holding|violated|collapsed); disputed = any dispute entry. No track overrides another. Without a dated `terminated` declaration the termination is unconfirmed. Count = agreements whose latest declared status is in_force/extended, with no superseded declaration, and whose latest observed status is not collapsed; an extension (extension_of) of a counted agreement is not counted again. As of 2026-10-19.
  1. VERY CLOSE™
  2. DEAL!
  3. COMPLICATEDYOU ARE HERE
  4. NEVER MIND
  5. PRODUCTIVE TALKS

↺ back to the top. Laps completed: 7

DERIVED M1 · M3 · M12 · 109 deal-related records · methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.very_close_status
M1. "open" if the latest very-close interval has no terminating record as of 2026-10-19. detail.days = days in the current interval (inclusive) when open, or days since it was terminated when closed.
inputs (3): clm-2026-08-04-001, clm-2026-08-04-003, clm-2026-08-17-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.days_since_last_very_close
M6. Calendar days (America/New_York) from the most recent DEAL_VERY_CLOSE/DEAL_SOON claim by a U.S. executive-branch principal (same qualifier as M1) to the dashboard date (2026-10-19). 0 = today. Null if none on record.
inputs (1): clm-2026-08-04-003
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.deal_loop_state
M12. State of the latest deal-related record on or before 2026-10-19 (instant order, ties by id). Map: DEAL_VERY_CLOSE (claim) → VERY CLOSE™; DEAL_SOON (claim) → VERY CLOSE™; DEAL_REACHED (event) → DEAL!; DEAL_FRAMEWORK (event) → DEAL!; DEAL_PROPOSED → COMPLICATED; TALKS_PAUSED → COMPLICATED; DEAL_DEAD → NEVER MIND; NO_DEAL → NEVER MIND; TALKS_OFF → NEVER MIND; TALKS_NOT_HAPPENING → NEVER MIND; TALKS_STARTED → PRODUCTIVE TALKS; TALKS_PRODUCTIVE → PRODUCTIVE TALKS. Other record types are ignored.
inputs (1): evt-2026-10-18-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.deals_announced
Count of DEAL_REACHED + DEAL_FRAMEWORK events on or before 2026-10-19, whatever became of them.
inputs (7): evt-2026-03-25-001, evt-2026-05-23-001, evt-2026-06-12-001, evt-2026-06-14-001, evt-2026-06-17-001, evt-2026-08-01-001, evt-2026-08-04-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.agreements_in_force
M13. Three separate tracks, entries dated on or before asOf only: declared = latest party declaration (in_force|extended|suspended|terminated|superseded|lapsed|claimed_over); observed = latest evidence entry (holding|violated|collapsed); disputed = any dispute entry. No track overrides another. Without a dated `terminated` declaration the termination is unconfirmed. Count = agreements whose latest declared status is in_force/extended, with no superseded declaration, and whose latest observed status is not collapsed; an extension (extension_of) of a counted agreement is not counted again. As of 2026-10-19.
inputs (23): clm-2026-04-07-004, clm-2026-04-21-001, clm-2026-04-21-002, clm-2026-07-08-001, evt-2026-04-07-001, evt-2026-04-08-001, evt-2026-04-13-001, evt-2026-04-21-001, evt-2026-05-07-001, evt-2026-05-25-001, evt-2026-06-14-001, evt-2026-06-17-001, evt-2026-06-20-001, evt-2026-06-25-001, evt-2026-06-26-001, evt-2026-06-27-001, evt-2026-06-28-001, evt-2026-07-07-001, evt-2026-07-07-002, evt-2026-07-07-004, evt-2026-07-08-001, evt-2026-07-08-002, evt-2026-08-17-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

The four-week war

WEEK 34.

“I don't want to see it go on too long. I always thought it would be four weeks. And we're a little ahead of schedule.”

Donald Trump · Phone interview with CNN's Jake Tapper · Mar 2

PROMISED
4 weeks
ACTUAL
33 weeks, 3 days
VARIANCE
+30 weeks

THE REVISION

“I stated, numerous times, that it would take 4-6 weeks to get rid of THE IRAN NUCLEAR THREAT, and I did it in one night!”

Donald Trump · Truth Social · Oct 1 · PolitiFact fact-check

+28 weeks even on the revised 6-week schedule.

DERIVED M11 · 8.4× the estimate

Source
Promise:
clm-2026-03-02-001 · WAR_ENDING_SOON · 2026-03-02
Source (primary):
CNN, 2026-03-02
Source (secondary):
KEYT (CNN), 2026-10-02
Source (secondary):
PolitiFact, 2026-10-02
Revision:
clm-2026-10-01-001 · 2026-10-01
Revision source (secondary):
PolitiFact, 2026-10-02
Revision source (secondary):
Raw Story, 2026-10-02
Revision source (secondary):
KEYT (CNN), 2026-10-02
Formula:
M11 duration_weeks. War week = ceil(day_number ÷ 7), day_number = 2026-10-19 − 2026-02-28 + 1 (D2) = 234. Promised: 4 weeks (clm-2026-03-02-001); revised: up to 6 weeks (clm-2026-10-01-001). variance = war_week − promised; multiple = day_number ÷ (promised × 7), one decimal.
How this is computed
derived.promise.four-week-war
M11 duration_weeks. War week = ceil(day_number ÷ 7), day_number = 2026-10-19 − 2026-02-28 + 1 (D2) = 234. Promised: 4 weeks (clm-2026-03-02-001); revised: up to 6 weeks (clm-2026-10-01-001). variance = war_week − promised; multiple = day_number ÷ (promised × 7), one decimal.
inputs (3): clm-2026-03-02-001, clm-2026-10-01-001, evt-2026-02-28-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
REWIND THE DISASTER →Drag back to any day of the war. See what was said, what was true, and what happened next.Day oneDay 234

TODAY’S NUMBERS

Change since Day 1, with the source for every figure.

U.S. gas

OFFICIAL

$4.33

per gallon, regular, U.S. average

+$1.39 (+47.5%) since Day 1 (vs $2.94, week of 2026-02-23)

week of 2026-10-12

Source
Cadence:
weekly
Definition:
U.S. regular gasoline, retail. EIA EMM_EPMR_PTE_NUS_DPG
Record:
energy.gas_regular_us:2026-10-12
Source record:
EMM_EPMR_PTE_NUS_DPG@2026-10-12
Retrieved:
2026-10-14T22:32:42.571Z
Published:
2026-10-14
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.energy.gas_regular_us (v1) · inputs: energy.gas_regular_us:2026-02-23, energy.gas_regular_us:2026-10-12 · M9. baseline = latest energy.gas_regular_us observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation.

Brent spot (physical)

OFFICIAL

$126.55

per barrel, EIA physical spot (futures trade separately)

+$55.23 (+77.4%) since Day 1 (vs $71.32, 2026-02-27)

as of 2026-10-14

Source
Cadence:
daily
Definition:
Brent crude, spot. EIA RBRTE
Record:
energy.brent:2026-10-14
Source record:
RBRTE@2026-10-14
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T13:08:34.428Z
Published:
2026-10-15
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.energy.brent (v1) · inputs: energy.brent:2026-02-27, energy.brent:2026-10-14 · M9. baseline = latest energy.brent observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation.

WTI

OFFICIAL

$101.91

per barrel, spot

+$34.95 (+52.2%) since Day 1 (vs $66.96, 2026-02-27)

as of 2026-10-14

Source
Cadence:
daily
Definition:
WTI crude, spot. EIA RWTC
Record:
energy.wti:2026-10-14
Source record:
RWTC@2026-10-14
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T13:08:34.428Z
Published:
2026-10-15
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.energy.wti (v1) · inputs: energy.wti:2026-02-27, energy.wti:2026-10-14 · M9. baseline = latest energy.wti observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation.

S&P 500

OBSERVED

7,659.44

index close

+780.56 (+11.3%) since Day 1 (vs 6,878.88, 2026-02-27)

as of 2026-10-16

Source
Cadence:
daily
Definition:
S&P 500. Display only; reproduction restricted.
Record:
market.sp500:2026-10-16
Source record:
SP500@2026-10-16
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T13:08:34.428Z
Citation:
Copyright © S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.market.sp500 (v1) · inputs: market.sp500:2026-02-27, market.sp500:2026-10-16 · M9. baseline = latest market.sp500 observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation.

VIX

OBSERVED

19.99

CBOE volatility index

+0.13 (+0.7%) since Day 1 (vs 19.86, 2026-02-27)

as of 2026-10-16

Source
Cadence:
daily
Definition:
CBOE VIX. Cite CBOE.
Record:
market.vix:2026-10-16
Source record:
VIXCLS@2026-10-16
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T13:46:40.993Z
Citation:
CBOE, reprinted with permission
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.market.vix (v1) · inputs: market.vix:2026-02-27, market.vix:2026-10-16 · M9. baseline = latest market.vix observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation.

10Y

OFFICIAL

5.10%

10-year Treasury yield

+1.13 pts (+28.5%) since Day 1 (vs 3.97%, 2026-02-27)

as of 2026-10-15

Source
Cadence:
daily
Definition:
10-year Treasury yield. FRED DGS10
Record:
market.us10y:2026-10-15
Source record:
DGS10@2026-10-15
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T13:08:34.428Z
Citation:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.market.us10y (v1) · inputs: market.us10y:2026-02-27, market.us10y:2026-10-15 · M9. baseline = latest market.us10y observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation.

Federal debt

OFFICIAL

$40.39T

total public debt outstanding

+$1.62T (+4.2%) since Day 1 (vs $38.77T, 2026-02-27)

as of 2026-10-15

Debt changed while the conflict was underway; this does not imply the conflict caused that increase.

Source
Cadence:
daily
Definition:
Total public debt outstanding. Debt to the Penny tot_pub_debt_out_amt
Record:
fiscal.us_debt:2026-10-15
Source record:
debt_to_penny@2026-10-15
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T13:08:34.428Z
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.fiscal.us_debt (v1) · inputs: fiscal.us_debt:2026-02-27, fiscal.us_debt:2026-10-15 · M9. baseline = latest fiscal.us_debt observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation.

DoD cost

MODEL

$38B

CBO estimate, DoD only

cumulative since Day 1; never summed with Brown

through 2026-08-01 · published 2026-09-15

Source
Cadence:
irregular
Definition:
War cost, CBO estimate (DoD only). Never summed with Brown.
Record:
cbo-62756-dod-cost (data/manual)
Published:
2026-09-15
Entered:
2026-09-25
Notes:
"As of August 1, 2026, the armed conflict with Iran has cost DoD approximately $38 billion." Includes replacing expended munitions and lost equipment, increased flying hours, other operations and fuel. Excludes costs borne by other parts of the federal government and costs already in the budget (basic operating costs of the forces involved).

Extra fuel cost

MODEL

$100B

U.S. gasoline + diesel vs. no-war counterfactual

cumulative since Day 1 (model estimate)

$760 per household (as of 2026-09-07)

as of 2026-09-07

Source
Cadence:
irregular
Definition:
Extra U.S. gasoline + diesel spending vs. no-war counterfactual (Brown). data/manual/brown.yaml. Last published figure only; never the tracker's extrapolated ticker.
Record:
brown-energy-cost-2026-09-07 (data/manual)
Published:
2026-09-08
Entered:
2026-09-25
Notes:
Model estimate: actual gasoline and diesel prices minus a no-war counterfactual. Tracker: https://iranwarcost.watson.brown.edu/
Cadence:
irregular
Definition:
Extra fuel spending per U.S. household (Brown, via Axios). data/manual/brown.yaml.
Record:
brown-energy-cost-per-household-2026-09-07 (data/manual)
Published:
2026-09-07
Entered:
2026-09-25
Notes:
Axios: "more than $760 since the war began Feb. 28". Brown's own Sep 8 brief says "over $750". We show the Axios figure (the one DECISIONS.md verified) and keep the brief's wording here.

Approval

POLL

32%

approve of Trump's job performance

−6 pts (−15.8%) since Day 1 (vs 40%, Reuters/Ipsos fielded 2026-02-18 to 2026-02-23, n=4,638, ±1.5)

Reuters/Ipsos · disapprove 65% · n=4,506 adults · ±1.5 pts

fielded 2026-09-30 to 2026-10-05

Source
Cadence:
irregular
Definition:
Trump job approval (Reuters/Ipsos). Keep pollster, question, field dates, n, MoE. poll.* observation series are Reuters/Ipsos only; every other pollster lives in the data/polls archive (see M10).
Record:
poll.trump_overall:2026-10-05
Source record:
reuters-ipsos-2026-10-large-sample-Approval5_Sum
Retrieved:
2026-10-14T22:29:12.924Z
Published:
2026-10-05
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.poll.trump_overall (v1) · inputs: poll.trump_overall:2026-02-16, poll.trump_overall:2026-10-05 · M9. baseline = latest poll.trump_overall observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation. Poll readings count from published_at, not fieldwork end: baseline = latest poll.trump_overall observation published on or before 2026-02-28; latest = latest one published on or before 2026-10-19.
Question:
Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president? (If Skipped) If you had to choose, do you lean more towards approve or disapprove?
Method:
Online, probability-based Ipsos KnowledgePanel; MoE at 95% confidence including design effect (1.06)

Election

DERIVED

15

days to the midterms

general election 2026-11-03 (2 U.S.C. §7)

Source
Cadence:
per_run
Definition:
Days to the 2026 general election. Nov 3 2026 per 2 U.S.C. §7.
Record:
fec-2026-general-election (data/manual)
Entered:
2026-09-25
Notes:
Statute text https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/7.
Formula:
calendar days from 2026-10-19 (America/New_York) to 2026-11-03

THE SCHEDULING DEPARTMENT

Promised timelines, checked against a clock.

“It shook it up. It delayed the signing by a few hours. It was supposed to be now. Now it is scheduled for a few hours from now.”

Donald Trump, President · Phone interview with Axios · Jun 14

3,047

hours later.

Running a little late.

Source
Claim:
clm-2026-06-14-001 · DEAL_SOON · 2026-06-14 (day precision)
Source (secondary):
Axios, 2026-06-14
Formula:
M11 hours_from. Whole hours from the claim (2026-06-14, day precision → 12:00 America/New_York) to the run instant 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z, rounded down.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.promise.signing-now
M11 hours_from. Whole hours from the claim (2026-06-14, day precision → 12:00 America/New_York) to the run instant 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z, rounded down.
inputs (1): clm-2026-06-14-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
“You never like to say too early you won. We won. In the first hour it was over.”

Donald Trump, President · Rally, Hebron, Kentucky · Mar 11

5,601

and counting: the current hour of the war.

Extended overtime.

Source
Claim:
clm-2026-03-11-001 · VICTORY · 2026-03-11 (day precision)
Source (secondary):
Malay Mail (AFP), 2026-03-12
Source (secondary):
Kentucky Lantern, 2026-03-12
Formula:
M11 now_complete (war_hour). Current hour of the war: floor((2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z − WAR_START 2026-02-28T06:35:00+00:00) ÷ 1 h) + 1, so the first hour is hour 1.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.promise.over-in-first-hour
M11 now_complete (war_hour). Current hour of the war: floor((2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z − WAR_START 2026-02-28T06:35:00+00:00) ÷ 1 h) + 1, so the first hour is hour 1.
inputs (2): clm-2026-03-11-001, evt-2026-02-28-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
“I think the war is very complete, pretty much.”

Donald Trump, President · CBS News phone interview (Doral, FL) · Mar 9

224

days ago.

Pretty much.

Source
Claim:
clm-2026-03-09-001 · VICTORY · 2026-03-09 (day precision)
Source (secondary):
CBS News, 2026-03-09
Formula:
M11 now_complete. Calendar days (America/New_York) from the claim date 2026-03-09 to 2026-10-19.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.promise.very-complete
M11 now_complete. Calendar days (America/New_York) from the claim date 2026-03-09 to 2026-10-19.
inputs (1): clm-2026-03-09-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
“I think the war is going to end immediately after the election.”

Donald Trump, President · Remarks to reporters, Joint Base Andrews, before departing for Dallas · Sep 9

15

days to Nov 3.

We've set a reminder.

Source
Claim:
clm-2026-09-09-001 · WAR_ENDING_SOON · 2026-09-09 (day precision)
Source (secondary):
The National, 2026-09-09
Source (secondary):
The Hill, 2026-09-09
Source (secondary):
Israel Hayom, 2026-09-10
Source (secondary):
JINSA, 2026-09-11
Target date:
2026-11-03 (data/manual/promises.yaml: ends-after-election)
Formula:
M11 ends_by_date. Calendar days (America/New_York) from 2026-10-19 until the promised date 2026-11-03. Switches from "until" to "since" the day after the target.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.promise.ends-after-election
M11 ends_by_date. Calendar days (America/New_York) from 2026-10-19 until the promised date 2026-11-03. Switches from "until" to "since" the day after the target.
inputs (1): clm-2026-09-09-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

THE COUNTERS

What the news cycle forgot. We didn’t.

Days spent “very close™”

79

out of 234 days at war.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.days_very_close
M1. Interval starts on a DEAL_VERY_CLOSE/DEAL_SOON claim by a U.S. executive-branch principal (roles: president, vice president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, secretary of war, secretary of defense/war, treasury secretary, secretary of the treasury, white house press secretary, special envoy, presidential adviser / envoy). Ends on the first strictly-later event/claim of type DEAL_REACHED, DEAL_DEAD, NO_DEAL, TALKS_OFF, TALKS_NOT_HAPPENING (any actor). Silence does not end an interval; a qualifying claim inside an open interval is absorbed. Value = unique calendar days (America/New_York) in the union of intervals, both ends inclusive, open interval runs to 2026-10-19.
inputs (26): clm-2026-03-23-002, clm-2026-03-26-002, clm-2026-03-30-001, clm-2026-04-05-002, clm-2026-04-07-003, clm-2026-04-12-001, clm-2026-04-15-001, clm-2026-04-20-001, clm-2026-05-05-001, clm-2026-05-08-002, clm-2026-05-11-001, clm-2026-05-18-001, clm-2026-05-23-001, clm-2026-05-25-002, clm-2026-05-29-002, clm-2026-05-30-001, clm-2026-06-11-002, clm-2026-06-13-001, clm-2026-06-14-001, clm-2026-06-14-004, clm-2026-08-01-001, clm-2026-08-03-002, clm-2026-08-04-001, clm-2026-08-04-003, clm-2026-08-17-001, evt-2026-06-14-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.days_at_war
D2. day_number = 2026-10-19 − 2026-02-28 + 1, calendar days in America/New_York. Day 1 anchored to the WAR_START record.
inputs (1): evt-2026-02-28-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Deals announced

7

Deals and frameworks, all-time.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.deals_announced
Count of DEAL_REACHED + DEAL_FRAMEWORK events on or before 2026-10-19, whatever became of them.
inputs (7): evt-2026-03-25-001, evt-2026-05-23-001, evt-2026-06-12-001, evt-2026-06-14-001, evt-2026-06-17-001, evt-2026-08-01-001, evt-2026-08-04-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Deals still operating

0

Promising.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.deals_operating
M3. Count of DEAL_REACHED + DEAL_FRAMEWORK events with no terminating event under M2 (DEAL_DEAD, CEASEFIRE_BROKEN, TALKS_OFF event, or STRIKE/RETALIATION with severity ≥ 4).
inputs (11): evt-2026-03-25-001, evt-2026-04-08-001, evt-2026-05-23-001, evt-2026-06-05-001, evt-2026-06-12-001, evt-2026-06-14-001, evt-2026-06-17-001, evt-2026-06-26-001, evt-2026-08-01-001, evt-2026-08-04-001, evt-2026-08-17-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Avg. breakthrough lifespan

12.5 days

History takes time.

median 13 days

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.breakthrough_lifespan_mean
M2. Arithmetic mean of lifespan_days over dead breakthroughs only (n=11); operating ones excluded. Rounded to 0.1 day.
inputs (17): evt-2026-03-25-001, evt-2026-04-07-001, evt-2026-04-08-001, evt-2026-04-16-001, evt-2026-04-21-001, evt-2026-05-07-001, evt-2026-05-23-001, evt-2026-06-05-001, evt-2026-06-12-001, evt-2026-06-14-001, evt-2026-06-17-001, evt-2026-06-26-001, evt-2026-06-28-001, evt-2026-07-07-002, evt-2026-08-01-001, evt-2026-08-04-001, evt-2026-08-17-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.breakthrough_lifespan_median
M2. Median of lifespan_days over dead breakthroughs only (n=11); operating ones excluded. Even n → mean of the two middle values.
inputs (17): evt-2026-03-25-001, evt-2026-04-07-001, evt-2026-04-08-001, evt-2026-04-16-001, evt-2026-04-21-001, evt-2026-05-07-001, evt-2026-05-23-001, evt-2026-06-05-001, evt-2026-06-12-001, evt-2026-06-14-001, evt-2026-06-17-001, evt-2026-06-26-001, evt-2026-06-28-001, evt-2026-07-07-002, evt-2026-08-01-001, evt-2026-08-04-001, evt-2026-08-17-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Hormuz “opening soon” claims

22

Ships that showed up: 4.1 a day (PortWatch, 7-day mean).

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.hormuz_reopening_claims
M5. Count of HORMUZ_OPEN + HORMUZ_OPEN_SOON claims by any official actor on or before 2026-10-19. Each is paired with the hormuz.transits_daily observation (IMF PortWatch) for that date; null until the adapter has run.
inputs (22): clm-2026-03-09-002, clm-2026-04-07-004, clm-2026-04-11-001, clm-2026-05-03-001, clm-2026-05-29-001, clm-2026-06-13-002, clm-2026-06-14-002, clm-2026-06-14-006, clm-2026-06-18-002, clm-2026-06-20-001, clm-2026-07-11-001, clm-2026-07-13-001, clm-2026-08-04-002, clm-2026-08-12-001, clm-2026-08-18-002, clm-2026-08-25-001, clm-2026-08-27-001, clm-2026-08-27-003, clm-2026-09-22-004, clm-2026-09-25-002, clm-2026-10-07-001, clm-2026-10-15-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Ceasefires

4 reached

2 formally broken.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.ceasefires_reached
M4. Count of CEASEFIRE_REACHED events on or before 2026-10-19.
inputs (4): evt-2026-04-07-001, evt-2026-04-16-001, evt-2026-04-21-001, evt-2026-06-28-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.ceasefires_broken
M4. CEASEFIRE_REACHED events followed by a CEASEFIRE_BROKEN event before any later CEASEFIRE_REACHED.
inputs (6): evt-2026-04-07-001, evt-2026-04-08-001, evt-2026-04-16-001, evt-2026-04-21-001, evt-2026-06-28-001, evt-2026-07-08-002
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Missing transits

17,685

Ships that would have crossed on a normal day, since Day 1.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.hormuz_missing_transits
M8. Σ max(0, baseline − n_total) over PortWatch days from 2026-02-28 to 2026-10-11 (226 days with data), baseline 84.8/day. Rounded to a whole transit. Days PortWatch has not published yet are not counted.
inputs (227): hormuz.transits_baseline:2026-02-27, hormuz.transits_daily:2026-02-28 … 2026-10-11 (226 daily records)
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Days since last ceasefire

113

Last one: Jun 28, 2026.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.days_since_last_ceasefire
M6. Calendar days (America/New_York) from the most recent CEASEFIRE_REACHED event to the dashboard date (2026-10-19). 0 = today. Null if none on record.
inputs (1): evt-2026-06-28-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

This conflict has gone

3

Days without an escalation

Last reset: Oct 16 · Tankers attacked off Al Jubayl, Saudi Arabia — one hit by an unknown projectile, one by an RPG from a small boat

Escalation = strike, retaliation or ship incident, severity ≥ 3 (M6).

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.days_since_last_escalation
M6. Calendar days (America/New_York) from the most recent STRIKE/RETALIATION/SHIP_INCIDENT event with severity ≥ 3, verification: recorded only (unverified claims don't reset the counter) to the dashboard date (2026-10-19). 0 = today. Null if none on record.
inputs (1): evt-2026-10-16-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Days since last victory claim

2

Last one: Oct 17, 2026.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.days_since_last_victory_claim
M6. Calendar days (America/New_York) from the most recent VICTORY claim (any actor) to the dashboard date (2026-10-19). 0 = today. Null if none on record.
inputs (1): clm-2026-10-17-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Days since last “very close”

76

Last one: Aug 4, 2026.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.days_since_last_very_close
M6. Calendar days (America/New_York) from the most recent DEAL_VERY_CLOSE/DEAL_SOON claim by a U.S. executive-branch principal (same qualifier as M1) to the dashboard date (2026-10-19). 0 = today. Null if none on record.
inputs (1): clm-2026-08-04-003
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

HOW’S THAT POLLING?

The actual questions people were asked.

Meanwhile, the deal is

NOT CLOSE

79 cumulative days “very close”

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.very_close_status
M1. "open" if the latest very-close interval has no terminating record as of 2026-10-19. detail.days = days in the current interval (inclusive) when open, or days since it was terminated when closed.
inputs (3): clm-2026-08-04-001, clm-2026-08-04-003, clm-2026-08-17-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z
derived.days_very_close
M1. Interval starts on a DEAL_VERY_CLOSE/DEAL_SOON claim by a U.S. executive-branch principal (roles: president, vice president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, secretary of war, secretary of defense/war, treasury secretary, secretary of the treasury, white house press secretary, special envoy, presidential adviser / envoy). Ends on the first strictly-later event/claim of type DEAL_REACHED, DEAL_DEAD, NO_DEAL, TALKS_OFF, TALKS_NOT_HAPPENING (any actor). Silence does not end an interval; a qualifying claim inside an open interval is absorbed. Value = unique calendar days (America/New_York) in the union of intervals, both ends inclusive, open interval runs to 2026-10-19.
inputs (26): clm-2026-03-23-002, clm-2026-03-26-002, clm-2026-03-30-001, clm-2026-04-05-002, clm-2026-04-07-003, clm-2026-04-12-001, clm-2026-04-15-001, clm-2026-04-20-001, clm-2026-05-05-001, clm-2026-05-08-002, clm-2026-05-11-001, clm-2026-05-18-001, clm-2026-05-23-001, clm-2026-05-25-002, clm-2026-05-29-002, clm-2026-05-30-001, clm-2026-06-11-002, clm-2026-06-13-001, clm-2026-06-14-001, clm-2026-06-14-004, clm-2026-08-01-001, clm-2026-08-03-002, clm-2026-08-04-001, clm-2026-08-04-003, clm-2026-08-17-001, evt-2026-06-14-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z

Expect U.S. involvement in Iran to go on for an extended period

POLL

82%

Go on for an extended period of time

“Just your impression, do you think U.S. military involvement in Iran will ...”

no pre-war reading of this question on record

Source
Record:
poll.conflict_duration:2026-09-20 · reuters-ipsos-2026-09-core-political-CAA2
Question:
Just your impression, do you think U.S. military involvement in Iran will ...
Response:
Go on for an extended period of time 82% · End pretty quickly in a matter of weeks 15%
Method:
Online, probability-based Ipsos KnowledgePanel; MoE at 95% confidence including design effect
Published:
2026-09-21

Approve of U.S. military strikes against Iran

POLL

33%

Approve

“Overall, do you approve or disapprove of U.S. military strikes against Iran?”

no pre-war reading of this question on record

Source
Record:
poll.iran_policy:2026-10-05 · reuters-ipsos-2026-10-large-sample-TM3363Y26
Question:
Overall, do you approve or disapprove of U.S. military strikes against Iran?
Response:
Approve 33% · Disapprove 62%
Method:
Online, probability-based Ipsos KnowledgePanel; MoE at 95% confidence including design effect (1.06)
Published:
2026-10-12

Approve of Trump's handling of your cost of living

POLL

21%

Approve

“Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling the following issues? Your cost of living”

−9 pts since Day 1 (vs 30%, fielded Feb 13–16, 2026, n=1,117)

Source
Record:
poll.cost_living:2026-10-05 · reuters-ipsos-2026-10-large-sample-TM1128Y17_8
Question:
Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Donald Trump is handling the following issues? Your cost of living
Response:
Approve (Net) 21% · Disapprove (Net) 67%
Method:
Online, probability-based Ipsos KnowledgePanel; MoE at 95% confidence including design effect (1.06)
Published:
2026-10-12
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.poll.cost_living (v1) · inputs: poll.cost_living:2026-02-16, poll.cost_living:2026-10-05 · M9. baseline = latest poll.cost_living observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation. Poll readings count from published_at, not fieldwork end: baseline = latest poll.cost_living observation published on or before 2026-02-28; latest = latest one published on or before 2026-10-19.

Trump job approval

POLL

32%

Approve

“Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president? (If Skipped) If you…”

−6 pts since Day 1 (vs 38%, fielded Feb 13–16, 2026, n=1,117)

Source
Record:
poll.trump_overall:2026-10-05 · reuters-ipsos-2026-10-large-sample-Approval5_Sum
Question:
Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president? (If Skipped) If you had to choose, do you lean more towards approve or disapprove?
Response:
Approve (Net) 32% · Disapprove (Net) 65%
Method:
Online, probability-based Ipsos KnowledgePanel; MoE at 95% confidence including design effect (1.06)
Published:
2026-10-05
Change since Day 1:
derived.change_since_day1.poll.trump_overall (v1) · inputs: poll.trump_overall:2026-02-16, poll.trump_overall:2026-10-05 · M9. baseline = latest poll.trump_overall observation on or before 2026-02-28; change = latest (on or before 2026-10-19) − baseline; pct = change ÷ baseline. change rounded to 1e-6. Null until there is a baseline and a later observation. Poll readings count from published_at, not fieldwork end: baseline = latest poll.trump_overall observation published on or before 2026-02-28; latest = latest one published on or before 2026-10-19.

Country heading in the right direction

POLL

17%

Right direction

“Generally speaking, would you say things in this country are heading in the right direction, or are they off on the…”

no pre-war reading of this question on record

Source
Record:
poll.right_track:2026-09-20 · reuters-ipsos-2026-09-core-political-CP2
Question:
Generally speaking, would you say things in this country are heading in the right direction, or are they off on the wrong track?
Response:
Right direction 17% · Wrong track 68%
Method:
Online, probability-based Ipsos KnowledgePanel; MoE at 95% confidence including design effect
Published:
2026-09-21

Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Sep 17–20, 2026 · U.S. adults 18+ · n=1,277 · ±2.8 pts · source

Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Sep 30–Oct 5, 2026 · U.S. adults 18+ (A) · n=4,506 · ±1.5 pts · source

Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Sep 30–Oct 5, 2026 · U.S. adults 18+ (A) · n=4,506 · ±1.5 pts · source

Trump job approval, every poll

POLL
  • Reuters/Ipsos (19)
  • Economist/YouGov (17)
  • Echelon Insights (9)
  • AP-NORC (2)
  • Rasmussen Reports (2)
  • CBS News/YouGov (1)
  • CNN/SSRS (1)
  • Emerson College (1)
  • Fox News (1)
  • NPR/PBS News/Marist (1)
  • Pew Research Center (1)
  • Quinnipiac University (1)
  • 14-day average (M10): 38.0% on 2026-10-19
  • Day 1
Trump job approval, Jan 15–Oct 19, 2026: every poll in the archive and our poll.trump_overall 14-day average56 approval polls from 12 pollsters, plotted at the last field date, approve percent on the y axis. The line is M10, the mean of each pollster's latest poll in the 14 days ending on each date; 38.0% on 2026-10-19. A vertical rule marks Day 1, 2026-02-28.25%30%35%40%45%50%FebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctDay 1Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Jan 23–25, 2026 · A · approve 38%, disapprove 59%Echelon Insights · fielded Jan 22–26, 2026 · LV · approve 41%, disapprove 57%Economist/YouGov · fielded Jan 30–Feb 2, 2026 · A · approve 40%, disapprove 54%Economist/YouGov · fielded Feb 6–9, 2026 · A · approve 37%, disapprove 56%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Feb 13–16, 2026 · A · approve 38%, disapprove 60%Echelon Insights · fielded Feb 19–23, 2026 · LV · approve 44%, disapprove 55%Economist/YouGov · fielded Feb 20–23, 2026 · A · approve 39%, disapprove 57%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Feb 18–23, 2026 · A · approve 40%, disapprove 58%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Feb 28–Mar 1, 2026 · A · approve 38%, disapprove 60%Economist/YouGov · fielded Feb 27–Mar 2, 2026 · A · approve 38%, disapprove 59%Economist/YouGov · fielded Mar 6–9, 2026 · A · approve 40%, disapprove 55%Echelon Insights · fielded Mar 12–16, 2026 · LV · approve 41%, disapprove 57%Economist/YouGov · fielded Mar 13–16, 2026 · A · approve 37%, disapprove 56%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Mar 17–19, 2026 · A · approve 40%, disapprove 58%Economist/YouGov · fielded Mar 20–23, 2026 · A · approve 38%, disapprove 56%Economist/YouGov · fielded Mar 27–30, 2026 · A · approve 35%, disapprove 58%Economist/YouGov · fielded Apr 3–6, 2026 · A · approve 38%, disapprove 55%Economist/YouGov · fielded Apr 10–13, 2026 · A · approve 38%, disapprove 56%Echelon Insights · fielded Apr 17–20, 2026 · LV · approve 41%, disapprove 57%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Apr 15–20, 2026 · A · approve 35%, disapprove 62%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Apr 24–27, 2026 · A · approve 34%, disapprove 64%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded May 8–11, 2026 · A · approve 36%, disapprove 63%Echelon Insights · fielded May 14–18, 2026 · LV · approve 40%, disapprove 59%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded May 15–18, 2026 · A · approve 35%, disapprove 63%Economist/YouGov · fielded May 29–Jun 1, 2026 · A · approve 35%, disapprove 61%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Jun 3–8, 2026 · A · approve 35%, disapprove 63%Echelon Insights · fielded Jun 11–14, 2026 · LV · approve 40%, disapprove 59%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Jun 18–22, 2026 · A · approve 34%, disapprove 64%Economist/YouGov · fielded Jul 3–6, 2026 · A · approve 35%, disapprove 61%Echelon Insights · fielded Jul 9–13, 2026 · LV · approve 38%, disapprove 61%Economist/YouGov · fielded Jul 17–20, 2026 · A · approve 36%, disapprove 60%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Jul 24–26, 2026 · A · approve 37%, disapprove 61%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Jul 29–Aug 3, 2026 · A · approve 35%, disapprove 63%Echelon Insights · fielded Aug 13–17, 2026 · LV · approve 40%, disapprove 59%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Aug 14–17, 2026 · A · approve 33%, disapprove 64%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Aug 21–24, 2026 · A · approve 33%, disapprove 65%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Aug 28–31, 2026 · A · approve 33%, disapprove 63%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Sep 11–14, 2026 · A · approve 35%, disapprove 62%NPR/PBS News/Marist · fielded Sep 14–15, 2026 · RV · approve 39%, disapprove 59%CNN/SSRS · fielded Sep 16–17, 2026 · A · approve 33%, disapprove 67%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Sep 17–20, 2026 · A · approve 32%, disapprove 66%Echelon Insights · fielded Sep 17–21, 2026 · LV · approve 36%, disapprove 64%Economist/YouGov · fielded Sep 18–21, 2026 · RV · approve 35%, disapprove 62%Emerson College · fielded Sep 21–22, 2026 · LV · approve 39%, disapprove 58%Rasmussen Reports · fielded Sep 20–24, 2026 · LV · approve 44%, disapprove 56%Quinnipiac University · fielded Sep 24–27, 2026 · RV · approve 34%, disapprove 61%AP-NORC · fielded Sep 24–28, 2026 · A · approve 31%, disapprove 69%Economist/YouGov · fielded Sep 25–28, 2026 · RV · approve 36%, disapprove 62%CBS News/YouGov · fielded Sep 30–Oct 2, 2026 · A · approve 39%, disapprove 61%Pew Research Center · fielded Sep 28–Oct 4, 2026 · A · approve 30%, disapprove 68%Economist/YouGov · fielded Oct 2–5, 2026 · RV · approve 38%, disapprove 60%Reuters/Ipsos · fielded Sep 30–Oct 5, 2026 · A · approve 32%, disapprove 65%AP-NORC · fielded Oct 8–12, 2026 · A · approve 35%, disapprove 64%Economist/YouGov · fielded Oct 10–12, 2026 · RV · approve 38%, disapprove 61%Fox News · fielded Oct 9–12, 2026 · RV · approve 36%, disapprove 64%Rasmussen Reports · fielded Oct 12–18, 2026 · LV · approve 43%, disapprove 55%14-day avg 38.0%
DERIVEDblack line: derived.approval_avg_14d, our own average, not RealClearPolitics’
Source
Metric:
derived.approval_avg_14d (v1)
Formula:
M10. Mean approve % of the latest poll.trump_overall poll from each distinct pollster with field_end in 2026-10-06..2026-10-19 (14 calendar days ending on the as-of date) and published by then. One poll per pollster; adults, registered and likely voters pooled; unweighted; rounded to 0.1. Null when no pollster has a poll in the window. Our own average, not RealClearPolitics'.
Inputs:
4 polls as of 2026-10-19: ap-norc-2026-10-08-12-trump-overall, economist-yougov-2026-10-10-10-12-trump-overall, fox-news-2026-10-09-12-trump-overall, rasmussen-2026-10-19-release-trump-overall
Line:
recomputed for every date from 2026-01-15 to 2026-10-19; gaps where no pollster has a poll in the window
All 56 approval polls
PollsterField datesPop.nApproveDisapproveRelease
Rasmussen ReportsOct 12–18, 2026LV1,50043%55%link
Fox NewsOct 9–12, 2026RV1,20236%64%link
Economist/YouGovOct 10–12, 2026RV1,40338%61%link
AP-NORCOct 8–12, 2026A1,11935%64%link
Reuters/IpsosSep 30–Oct 5, 2026A4,50632%65%link
Economist/YouGovOct 2–5, 2026RV1,38138%60%link
Pew Research CenterSep 28–Oct 4, 2026A5,06230%68%link
CBS News/YouGovSep 30–Oct 2, 2026A2,16639%61%link
Economist/YouGovSep 25–28, 2026RV1,42936%62%link
AP-NORCSep 24–28, 2026A2,14031%69%link
Quinnipiac UniversitySep 24–27, 2026RV1,03234%61%link
Rasmussen ReportsSep 20–24, 2026LV1,50044%56%link
Emerson CollegeSep 21–22, 2026LV1,00039%58%link
Economist/YouGovSep 18–21, 2026RV1,40135%62%link
Echelon InsightsSep 17–21, 2026LV1,00236%64%link
Reuters/IpsosSep 17–20, 2026A1,27732%66%link
CNN/SSRSSep 16–17, 2026A1,20633%67%link
NPR/PBS News/MaristSep 14–15, 2026RV1,28039%59%link
Reuters/IpsosSep 11–14, 2026A1,14335%62%link
Reuters/IpsosAug 28–31, 2026A1,16733%63%link
Reuters/IpsosAug 21–24, 2026A1,21533%65%link
Reuters/IpsosAug 14–17, 2026A1,16633%64%link
Echelon InsightsAug 13–17, 2026LV1,00240%59%link
Reuters/IpsosJul 29–Aug 3, 2026A4,50535%63%link
Reuters/IpsosJul 24–26, 2026A1,24837%61%link
Economist/YouGovJul 17–20, 2026A1,60236%60%link
Echelon InsightsJul 9–13, 2026LV1,00438%61%link
Economist/YouGovJul 3–6, 2026A1,60335%61%link
Reuters/IpsosJun 18–22, 2026A1,26234%64%link
Echelon InsightsJun 11–14, 2026LV1,01240%59%link
Reuters/IpsosJun 3–8, 2026A4,53135%63%link
Economist/YouGovMay 29–Jun 1, 2026A1,60435%61%link
Reuters/IpsosMay 15–18, 2026A1,27135%63%link
Echelon InsightsMay 14–18, 2026LV1,00840%59%link
Reuters/IpsosMay 8–11, 2026A1,25436%63%link
Reuters/IpsosApr 24–27, 2026A1,26934%64%link
Reuters/IpsosApr 15–20, 2026A4,55735%62%link
Echelon InsightsApr 17–20, 2026LV1,01241%57%link
Economist/YouGovApr 10–13, 2026A1,74838%56%link
Economist/YouGovApr 3–6, 2026A1,75038%55%link
Economist/YouGovMar 27–30, 2026A1,67935%58%link
Economist/YouGovMar 20–23, 2026A1,66538%56%link
Reuters/IpsosMar 17–19, 2026A1,54540%58%link
Economist/YouGovMar 13–16, 2026A1,59537%56%link
Echelon InsightsMar 12–16, 2026LV1,03341%57%link
Economist/YouGovMar 6–9, 2026A1,56340%55%link
Economist/YouGovFeb 27–Mar 2, 2026A1,51538%59%link
Reuters/IpsosFeb 28–Mar 1, 2026A1,28238%60%link
Reuters/IpsosFeb 18–23, 2026A4,63840%58%link
Economist/YouGovFeb 20–23, 2026A1,55139%57%link
Echelon InsightsFeb 19–23, 2026LV1,00244%55%link
Reuters/IpsosFeb 13–16, 2026A1,11738%60%link
Economist/YouGovFeb 6–9, 2026A1,73037%56%link
Economist/YouGovJan 30–Feb 2, 2026A1,67240%54%link
Echelon InsightsJan 22–26, 2026LV1,02941%57%link
Reuters/IpsosJan 23–25, 2026A1,13938%59%link

Records by pollster: Reuters/Ipsos 19 · Economist/YouGov 17 · Echelon Insights 9 · AP-NORC 2 · Rasmussen Reports 2 · CBS News/YouGov 1 · CNN/SSRS 1 · Emerson College 1 · Fox News 1 · NPR/PBS News/Marist 1 · Pew Research Center 1 · Quinnipiac University 1

RealClearPolling is used to discover polls. Every number here comes from the pollster’s own release.

FOLLOW THE BETS

What traders are pricing, next to what officials are saying.

Market prices are not forecasts we endorse. Not investment advice.

Kalshi · U.S.–Iran nuclear deal before 2027

OBSERVED

“Will the US agree to a new Iranian nuclear deal this year?”

YES = Before Jan 1, 2027

8.1¢/ 8.1% implied

Kalshi last traded price

−2.9¢ in 7 days (11¢ on Oct 12)

Kalshi YES price, Feb 28 to Oct 19234 daily readings on a 0–100¢ scale; low 5.9¢, high 78¢, latest 8.1¢.

daily since Feb 28

closes Jan 1, 2027, 15:00 UTC1.8M contracts traded

Meanwhile, on our record

Last “very close” / “soon” claim by a U.S. principal on our record: Aug 4, 2026 (76 days ago).

as of Oct 19, 2026, 13:21 UTC · kalshi.com

Resolution rules, verbatim from Kalshi

If the United States has agreed to, signed, or accepted a new Iran-US nuclear deal before Jan 1, 2027, then the market resolves to Yes.

An agreement also made with other countries (i.e. multilaterally) is still encompassed if the United States participates. "A new Iran-US nuclear deal" means a formal written agreement signed by authorized representatives of both the United States and Iran that (1) imposes verifiable restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, including limits on uranium enrichment, centrifuge numbers, or nuclear facility operations, AND (2) provides for the lifting, suspension, or modification of at least one US economic sanction on Iran in exchange for Iran's nuclear commitments. Clarification (04/19/26): The Agreement Long rulebook variable defines the nature of the qualifying instrument: it must be a formal written agreement signed by authorized representatives of both governments. It does not impose a precondition that the signing itself must occur before resolution. Because the Payout Criterion is satisfied if the United States has "agreed to, signed, or accepted" such an instrument, both governments publicly and officially agreeing to the terms of what will be a qualifying written agreement is sufficient to resolve the market to Yes, even if the formal signing has not yet taken place. Clarification (06/02/26): A qualifying instrument must impose "verifiable restrictions on Iran's nuclear program." A restriction is "verifiable" only where it establishes a concrete, objectively ascertainable standard (a defined limit, prohibition, quantity, or monitoring provision) against which compliance could in principle be confirmed; a general expression of intent that fixes no such standard is not considered “verifiable” for the purposes of this event. Accordingly, a bare pledge not to develop or pursue nuclear weapons, unaccompanied by any concrete limit on Iran's nuclear materials, activities, or facilities, does not on its own satisfy criterion (1). Conversely, a commitment to completely 'stop' or ‘suspend’ a specific nuclear activity (such as uranium enrichment) establishes a concrete prohibition (an implicit limit of zero) and qualifies as a restriction, whereas a vague promise to 'reduce' activities without a defined metric or monitoring mechanism does not. The enumerated examples (limits on uranium enrichment, centrifuge numbers, or nuclear facility operations) are illustrative and not exhaustive: a formal, verifiable commitment to remove, transfer, or cap Iran's stock of enriched uranium, confirmable by the receiving state or an oversight body, is a restriction on Iran's nuclear program and satisfies criterion (1). In every case, criterion (2) must independently be met. Clarification (06/17/26): To clarify, the U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding reportedly now in effect does not satisfy criterion (1) of the definition of a "new Iran-US nuclear deal," and this market will therefore not resolve to Yes on the basis of that instrument at this time. The memorandum provides for the existing state of Iran's nuclear program to be maintained pending a subsequent agreement, and defers the disposition of Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium to a mechanism to be mutually agreed in that subsequent agreement. That it states a minimum methodology for that future mechanism — down-blending on site under IAEA supervision — constrains the form of a mechanism yet to be agreed, but specifies no quantity, enrichment level, or completion deadline for the down-blending. An instrument that provides for maintaining Iran's nuclear program at an unspecified status quo, or that defers its substantive nuclear commitments to a subsequent agreement, does not by itself establish the concrete, objectively ascertainable standard that a "verifiable" restriction requires.

Source
Price shown:
last traded price, in cents per $1 YES contract. Cents ≈ the market's implied chance in percent; it is a trading price, not a forecast we endorse.
Record:
bets.kalshi.kxusairanagreement_27.yes_price:2026-10-19
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T13:21:00.581Z
History:
233 daily closes, 2026-02-28 → 2026-10-18; series bets.kalshi.kxusairanagreement_27.yes_price (Kalshi ticker KXUSAIRANAGREEMENT-27. Price: last trade; daily = candle close (00:00 ET). Exact question and rules travel with each snapshot row.)
Why it is on this page:
Highest-volume Kalshi contract on a U.S.–Iran deal; resolution requires a signed or officially agreed written nuclear agreement, the thing every DEAL_VERY_CLOSE claim promises. (editorial, data/manual/bets.yaml)
Our number:
derived.days_since_last_very_close (derived engine, methodology v1)

Polymarket · U.S.–Iran final nuclear deal by Dec 31

OBSERVED

“US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by December 31, 2026?”

14.5¢/ 14.5% implied

Polymarket displayed outcome price (Gamma outcomePrices)

±0¢ in 7 days (14.5¢ on Oct 12)

Polymarket YES price, Jun 26 to Oct 19114 daily readings on a 0–100¢ scale; low 7.5¢, high 47.5¢, latest 14.5¢.

daily since Jun 26

closes Jan 1, 2027, 04:59 UTC$3.5M traded (USDC)

Meanwhile, on our record

Last “very close” / “soon” claim by a U.S. principal on our record: Aug 4, 2026 (76 days ago).

as of Oct 19, 2026, 14:44 UTC · polymarket.com

Resolution rules, verbatim from Polymarket

On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics. This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.” Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures. If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including: (i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument; (ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries; (iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or (iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument. A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must: (i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting; (ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify. The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify: (i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument; (ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation; (iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks. A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify. Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies. An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied. Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran. The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.

Source
Price shown:
displayed outcome price (Gamma outcomePrices), in cents per $1 YES contract. Cents ≈ the market's implied chance in percent; it is a trading price, not a forecast we endorse.
Record:
bets.polymarket.2696747.yes_price:2026-10-19
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T14:44:39.633Z
History:
113 daily closes, 2026-06-26 → 2026-10-18; series bets.polymarket.2696747.yes_price (Polymarket Gamma market id 2696747. Price: Gamma outcomePrices; daily = prices-history sample at ~00:00 UTC. Exact question and rules travel with each snapshot row.)
Why it is on this page:
Polymarket's contract on the 'final deal' contemplated by the June 14 memorandum (corpus: Islamabad memorandum). Same question as the Kalshi deal market, different wording and venue. (editorial, data/manual/bets.yaml)
Our number:
derived.days_since_last_very_close (derived engine, methodology v1)

Polymarket · No U.S. strike on Iran through Oct 31

OBSERVED

“US x Iran ceasefire continues through October 31?”

84.5¢/ 84.5% implied

Polymarket displayed outcome price (Gamma outcomePrices)

+4¢ in 7 days (80.5¢ on Oct 12)

Polymarket YES price, Sep 17 to Oct 1932 daily readings on a 0–100¢ scale; low 39¢, high 84.5¢, latest 84.5¢.

daily since Sep 17

closes Oct 31, 2026, 23:59 UTC$4.1M traded (USDC)

Meanwhile, on our record

Last escalation on our record (strike, retaliation or ship incident, severity 3+): Oct 16, 2026 (3 days ago).

as of Oct 19, 2026, 14:44 UTC · polymarket.com

Resolution rules, verbatim from Polymarket

This market will resolve to “No” if the United States takes a qualifying military action against Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time. Otherwise this market will resolve to “Yes.” A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by the United States, that directly impacts Iran. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles. The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action: Munitions destroyed or intercepted before impact; Surface-to-air missile strikes; Small-arms fire; Ground incursions; Cyber operations; Naval gunfire and artillery fire; Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems); Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes; Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed. Any munition that is intercepted or destroyed before impact does not constitute a qualifying military action. Debris, fragments, or any wreckage from intercepted munitions that land on Iran do not constitute a military action regardless of any damage incurred. “Iran” refers to the terrestrial territory of Iran, including its internal waters. Iran’s maritime territory and airspace are not encompassed. Where territorial borders are disputed, all territory claimed by and under the de facto control of Iran as of market creation will qualify. The occurrence, attribution, and timing of a qualifying military action will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, attribution, or timing of a relevant military action, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, attribution, and timing of the action based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (Iran Standard Time) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the action. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. At the end of the third calendar day, if conflicting reports remain, the incident will be adjudicated based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments and militaries of the United States and Iran and a consensus of credible reporting.

Source
Price shown:
displayed outcome price (Gamma outcomePrices), in cents per $1 YES contract. Cents ≈ the market's implied chance in percent; it is a trading price, not a forecast we endorse.
Record:
bets.polymarket.4641065.yes_price:2026-10-19
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T14:44:39.633Z
History:
31 daily closes, 2026-09-17 → 2026-10-18; series bets.polymarket.4641065.yes_price (Polymarket Gamma market id 4641065. Price: Gamma outcomePrices; daily = prices-history sample at ~00:00 UTC. Exact question and rules travel with each snapshot row.)
Why it is on this page:
Titled as a ceasefire market, it resolves No on a qualifying U.S. air or missile strike that impacts Iranian territory. The page's only live contract on U.S. strikes. (editorial, data/manual/bets.yaml)
Our number:
derived.days_since_last_escalation (derived engine, methodology v1)

Polymarket · U.S.–Iran Hormuz agreement by Dec 31

OBSERVED

“US-Iran Hormuz Agreement by December 31?”

38¢/ 38% implied

Polymarket displayed outcome price (Gamma outcomePrices)

+4.5¢ in 7 days (33.5¢ on Oct 12)

Polymarket YES price, Sep 28 to Oct 1922 daily readings on a 0–100¢ scale; low 30.5¢, high 53¢, latest 38¢.

daily since Sep 28

closes Jan 1, 2027, 04:59 UTC$118.7K traded (USDC)

Meanwhile, on our record

Last “very close” / “soon” claim by a U.S. principal on our record: Aug 4, 2026 (76 days ago).

as of Oct 19, 2026, 14:44 UTC · polymarket.com

Resolution rules, verbatim from Polymarket

This market will resolve to “Yes” if a diplomatic agreement between the United States and Iran over traffic in the strait of Hormuz is announced by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. A diplomatic agreement refers to an official agreement, treaty, deal, or substantially similar diplomatic instrument that establishes agreed actions, policies, obligations, or commitments between the United States and Iran. A qualifying diplomatic agreement must establish Iranian policies, obligations, or commitments aimed at permitting, restoring, or increasing vessel or shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. All listed countries must announce their acceptance of the same qualifying diplomatic agreement for the Payout Condition to be met. A joint announcement will qualify, as will separate announcements from each entity of its own acceptance of an agreement which, taken together, directly indicate that all the listed countries accepted the same agreement. Separate announcements of individual policies will not qualify if the policies are not announced as part of a diplomatic agreement. Each announcement must be a declarative statement that clearly and unambiguously communicates acceptance of an agreement. Statements that reference ongoing negotiations or a prospective agreement, or that allude to or express support for an agreement without confirming acceptance of the agreement, do not qualify. A qualifying announcement need not reference the agreement by name or use specific terminology, provided it clearly communicates acceptance of an agreement. Whether announcements from the listed countries represent a diplomatic agreement and whether such an agreement qualifies will be primarily determined through the announcements themselves. Where an announcement is made by all listed countries but, based on the announcements, it remains ambiguous whether the announcements represent a qualifying diplomatic agreement between the countries, this market will remain open until either i) definitive confirmation that the announcements represent a qualifying diplomatic agreement between the listed entities is achieved through further announcements from the listed countries or a consensus of credible reporting or ii) 14 calendar days (ET) have passed after the date that the last country made their first potentially qualifying announcement. If, at the end of the fourteenth calendar day, no definitive confirmation has been achieved, this market will resolve based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments of the United States and Iran and a consensus of credible reporting.

Source
Price shown:
displayed outcome price (Gamma outcomePrices), in cents per $1 YES contract. Cents ≈ the market's implied chance in percent; it is a trading price, not a forecast we endorse.
Record:
bets.polymarket.5087228.yes_price:2026-10-19
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T14:44:39.633Z
History:
21 daily closes, 2026-09-28 → 2026-10-18; series bets.polymarket.5087228.yes_price (Polymarket Gamma market id 5087228. Price: Gamma outcomePrices; daily = prices-history sample at ~00:00 UTC. Exact question and rules travel with each snapshot row.)
Why it is on this page:
A narrower deal: an announced U.S.–Iran agreement on shipping through the Strait, the subject of the HORMUZ_OPEN / HORMUZ_OPEN_SOON claims. (editorial, data/manual/bets.yaml)
Our number:
derived.days_since_last_very_close (derived engine, methodology v1)

Polymarket · Hormuz traffic back to normal by Dec 31

OBSERVED

“Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by December 31?”

13.5¢/ 13.5% implied

Polymarket displayed outcome price (Gamma outcomePrices)

−1¢ in 7 days (14.5¢ on Oct 12)

Polymarket YES price, May 11 to Oct 19160 daily readings on a 0–100¢ scale; low 11.5¢, high 90.5¢, latest 13.5¢.

daily since May 11

closes Jan 1, 2027, 04:59 UTC$15.1M traded (USDC)

Meanwhile, on our record

IMF PortWatch 7-day mean on our Hormuz card: 4.1 transits/day (Oct 5–Oct 11).

as of Oct 19, 2026, 14:44 UTC · polymarket.com

Resolution rules, verbatim from Polymarket

This market will resolve to “Yes” if IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls (“Arrivals of Ships”) for the Strait of Hormuz equal to or above 60 for any date between market creation and December 31, 2026. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. Daily transit calls include container, dry bulk, roll-on/roll-off, general cargo, and tanker ships. Ships not reported by IMF Portwatch will not be considered. This market will resolve as soon as IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls equal to or above the specified level, or once data has been published for the final date in the specified period and no such value has been published. If no data has been published for the final date of the specified period within 14 calendar days (ET) after the end of that period, this market will resolve based on data published up to that point. Revisions to previously published data points made within this market’s timeframe will be considered. However, they will not disqualify a previously published data point from qualifying. Revisions to previously published data points after data is published for December 31, 2026, however, will not be considered. In case of obvious data integrity issues (i.e., erroneous data), the market may remain open until the end of the third calendar day (ET) after the date on which such data is first released to allow for corrections. Data integrity issues refer only to clerical or other similar errors in the underlying data, and do not include cases where IMF Portwatch differs from alternative sources. The resolution source for this market will be IMF Portwatch, specifically the transit calls data published for the Strait of Hormuz at https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730, both in the chart and through downloadable files.

Resolution source: https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730

Source
Price shown:
displayed outcome price (Gamma outcomePrices), in cents per $1 YES contract. Cents ≈ the market's implied chance in percent; it is a trading price, not a forecast we endorse.
Record:
bets.polymarket.2176270.yes_price:2026-10-19
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T14:44:39.633Z
History:
159 daily closes, 2026-05-11 → 2026-10-18; series bets.polymarket.2176270.yes_price (Polymarket Gamma market id 2176270. Price: Gamma outcomePrices; daily = prices-history sample at ~00:00 UTC. Exact question and rules travel with each snapshot row.)
Why it is on this page:
Resolves on IMF PortWatch's 7-day average of Hormuz transit calls reaching 60 — the same PortWatch series as our Hormuz card (M8). (editorial, data/manual/bets.yaml)
Our number:
derived.hormuz_transits_7d_mean (derived engine, methodology v1)

Kalshi · Hormuz 7-day average above 60 before 2027

OBSERVED

“Will the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz as reported by the IMF PortWatch be above 60 before January 1, 2027?”

YES = Before Jan 1, 2027

8¢/ 8% implied

Kalshi last traded price

−2¢ in 7 days (10¢ on Oct 12)

Kalshi YES price, Mar 17 to Oct 19217 daily readings on a 0–100¢ scale; low 6.4¢, high 96¢, latest 8¢.

daily since Mar 17

closes Jan 1, 2027, 14:59 UTC3.4M contracts traded

Meanwhile, on our record

IMF PortWatch 7-day mean on our Hormuz card: 4.1 transits/day (Oct 5–Oct 11).

as of Oct 19, 2026, 13:21 UTC · kalshi.com

Resolution rules, verbatim from Kalshi

If the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz as reported by the IMF PortWatch is above 60 before January 1, 2027, then the market resolves to Yes.

Source
Price shown:
last traded price, in cents per $1 YES contract. Cents ≈ the market's implied chance in percent; it is a trading price, not a forecast we endorse.
Record:
bets.kalshi.kxhormuznorm_26mar17_b270101.yes_price:2026-10-19
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T13:21:00.581Z
History:
216 daily closes, 2026-03-17 → 2026-10-18; series bets.kalshi.kxhormuznorm_26mar17_b270101.yes_price (Kalshi ticker KXHORMUZNORM-26MAR17-B270101. Price: last trade; daily = candle close (00:00 ET). Exact question and rules travel with each snapshot row.)
Why it is on this page:
Kalshi's version of the PortWatch ≥ 60 question, closing one day later than Polymarket's. Shown side by side so the two venues' prices can be compared. (editorial, data/manual/bets.yaml)
Our number:
derived.hormuz_transits_7d_mean (derived engine, methodology v1)

Kalshi · WTI front-month settles above $150 in 2026

OBSERVED

“Will the maximum WTI front month settle price reach $150.01 by Dec 31, 2026?”

YES = $150.01 or above

9.7¢/ 9.7% implied

Kalshi last traded price

+5¢ in 7 days (4.7¢ on Oct 12)

Kalshi YES price, Mar 5 to Oct 19229 daily readings on a 0–100¢ scale; low 3.2¢, high 51¢, latest 9.7¢.

daily since Mar 5

closes Dec 31, 2026, 19:30 UTC1M contracts traded

Meanwhile, on our record

EIA WTI spot (physical, not front-month futures): $101.91/bbl on Oct 14, 2026.

as of Oct 19, 2026, 13:21 UTC · kalshi.com

Resolution rules, verbatim from Kalshi

If ICE reports that the maximum price of oil (as defined exclusively by the set of WTI front-month settle prices) is above $150 between Issuance and Dec 31, 2026, then the market resolves to Yes.

Source
Price shown:
last traded price, in cents per $1 YES contract. Cents ≈ the market's implied chance in percent; it is a trading price, not a forecast we endorse.
Record:
bets.kalshi.kxwtimax_26dec31_t150.yes_price:2026-10-19
Retrieved:
2026-10-19T13:21:00.581Z
History:
228 daily closes, 2026-03-05 → 2026-10-18; series bets.kalshi.kxwtimax_26dec31_t150.yes_price (Kalshi ticker KXWTIMAX-26DEC31-T150. Price: last trade; daily = candle close (00:00 ET). Exact question and rules travel with each snapshot row.)
Why it is on this page:
The oil-shock tail. Resolves on ICE WTI front-month settlement prices, a futures series; our WTI card is the EIA physical spot price, so the two are labeled separately. (editorial, data/manual/bets.yaml)
Our number:
derived.change_since_day1.energy.wti (derived engine, methodology v1)

Prices from the platforms' public read APIs; contract wording and rules are copied verbatim from each market. Links go to the public market page, with no referral codes.

BEFORE THE HEADLINE

What was reported traded, when it was reported, and when the news came out.

Timing is not evidence of wrongdoing. We list only trades documented by named outlets, regulators or official inquiries.

Mar 23, 2026 · Strike postponement post

  1. Reported trade window ·

    WTI crude contracts on NYMEX; Brent: WTI 734 trades at 06:49, 2,168 a minute later (about $170m); Brent 20 to more than 1,650 (about $150m)

    As reported: 06:48 to 06:50 ET

    Reported by BBC (market data reviewed by the BBC)

    Hellenic Shipping News / BBC, Mar 24, 2026

  2. Reported trade window ·

    Brent and WTI crude futures: roughly 6,200 contracts, about $580 million

    As reported: between 6:49 am and 6:50 am New York time

    Reported by Financial Times (FT calculations using Bloomberg data)

    Asia Times / Common Dreams, Mar 24, 2026

  3. Reported trade window ·

    Brent and WTI crude futures (ICE, NYMEX): 5,100 lots, "well over $500 million"

    As reported: between 1049 and 1050 GMT

    Reported by Reuters (LSEG data and Reuters calculations)

    “It was not possible to establish who traded the oil.” — Reuters

    GMA News / Reuters, Mar 24, 2026

  4. Official announcement ·

    Donald Trump (Truth Social)

    Trump posted that he had instructed the Department of War to postpone strikes on Iranian power plants and energy infrastructure for five days, citing talks with Iran. Crude fell within minutes.

    Time: Reuters puts the post at 1105 GMT and CNBC at 7:05 a.m. New York time; the BBC gives 07:04 ET.

    Our record: evt-2026-03-23-001, clm-2026-03-23-001

    “I HAVE INSTRUCTED THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR TO POSTPONE ANY AND ALL MILITARY STRIKES...FOR A FIVE DAY PERIOD” — Donald Trump, Truth Social

    GMA News / Reuters, Mar 24, 2026The Nightly / CNBC, Mar 24, 2026

  5. Report published ·

    BBC News: “Oil traders bet millions minutes before Trump's Iran talks post”

    The Star (Kenya) / BBC News, Mar 24, 2026

  6. Report published ·

    Financial Times (as relayed by Torre News): “$580 million in oil bets placed moments before Trump's Iran post – FT”

    Torre News (citing the FT), Mar 24, 2026

  7. Report published ·

    Reuters: “Traders bet $500 million on oil price just before Trump's post on delay to Iran attack”

    CTV News / Reuters, Mar 24, 2026

Responses on record

  • Mar 23, 2026 Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of Iran's parliament. Denied that negotiations with the U.S. were under way.

    “fake news is used to manipulate the financial and oil markets” — Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf

    PBS NewsHour, Mar 23, 2026

  • Mar 24, 2026 White House spokesman Kush Desai, to the Financial Times. Statement to the FT.

    “The White House does not tolerate any administration official illegally profiteering off of insider knowledge.” — Kush Desai

    Asia Times / Common Dreams, Mar 24, 2026

  • Mar 24, 2026 ICE, CME Group, SEC, CFTC, White House (to Reuters). ICE and CME Group did not immediately respond to Reuters; the SEC declined to comment; the CFTC was not immediately available; the White House did not respond.

    GMA News / Reuters, Mar 24, 2026

Status as of Oct 19, 2026

Bloomberg reported on Oct 13 that the CFTC enforcement division is still examining the March 23 trading and that a referral by career staff was withdrawn at the direction of an adviser to the chairman. ABC News reported on May 7 that the Justice Department is also investigating. No charges or findings have been published as of Oct 19, 2026.

Apr 7, 2026 · Two-week ceasefire announcement

  1. Reported trade window ·

    Polymarket U.S.–Iran ceasefire contract (YES): at least 50 newly created wallets; one placed roughly $72,000 at an average 8.8 cents; another, created 12 minutes before the post, bought $31,908 of YES at 33.7 cents

    As reported: Tuesday, before Trump's post around 6:30 p.m. ET; one wallet created around 10 a.m. ET

    Reported by Associated Press (public Polymarket blockchain data, analyzed with Dune)

    “at least 50 accounts, or wallets, placed substantial "Yes" bets Tuesday” — Associated Press

    WTOP / AP, Apr 8, 2026

  2. Reported trade window ·

    Brent and U.S. crude futures: combined 8,600 lots sold (about 6,200 Brent, 2,400 WTI), about $950 million

    As reported: at 1945 GMT on Tuesday

    Reported by Reuters (LSEG data)

    The Standard (HK) / Reuters, Apr 8, 2026

  3. Official announcement ·

    Donald Trump (Truth Social)

    About 90 minutes before his 8 p.m. deadline, Trump announced a two-week suspension of bombing, mediated by Pakistan and conditioned on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Crude futures fell about 15% at the next session open.

    Time: Corpus record evt-2026-04-07-001 (6:32 p.m. ET); Reuters says "around 2230 GMT"; AP says around 6:30 p.m. ET.

    Our record: evt-2026-04-07-001, clm-2026-04-07-003

    “Almost all of the various points of past contention have been agreed to between the United States and Iran” — Donald Trump, Truth Social

    Al Jazeera, Apr 7, 2026

  4. Report published ·

    Associated Press: “Newly created Polymarket accounts bet big on US-Iran ceasefire in hours before Trump's announcement”

    News4JAX / AP, Apr 8, 2026

  5. Report published ·

    Reuters: “Traders place large $950 million bet on oil price falling hours ahead of ceasefire”

    The Standard (HK) / Reuters, Apr 8, 2026

Responses on record

  • Apr 8, 2026 CME Group and ICE (to Reuters). CME Group declined to comment; ICE did not immediately respond.

    The Standard (HK) / Reuters, Apr 8, 2026

  • Apr 8, 2026 Polymarket (to AP). Polymarket did not respond to a request for comment. It labeled the April 7 contract "disputed".

    WTOP / AP, Apr 8, 2026

  • Apr 8, 2026 Rep. Blake Moore (R-Utah). Statement to AP; Moore has introduced prediction-market legislation.

    “It's highly unlikely that these are good-faith trades; it's much more likely that these are insiders” — Rep. Blake Moore

    News4JAX / AP, Apr 8, 2026

Status as of Oct 19, 2026

Reuters reported on Apr 15 that the CFTC is examining the April 7 oil trades; ABC News reported on May 7 that the Justice Department is too. Senators asked the CFTC for answers by Apr 30 and a staff briefing by Jun 15; no reply has been published. No regulator statement on the Polymarket wallets found. No charges or findings published as of Oct 19, 2026.

Apr 17, 2026 · Hormuz "completely open" post

  1. Reported trade window ·

    Brent crude futures: combined 7,990 lots sold, about $760 million

    As reported: between 1224 GMT and 1225 GMT

    Reported by Reuters (LSEG data)

    BOE Report / Reuters, Apr 17, 2026

  2. Official announcement ·

    Abbas Araghchi, Iranian Foreign Minister (X)

    Araghchi posted that passage for all commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz was declared completely open. Crude fell as much as 11% in the minutes that followed. Iran closed the strait again the next day.

    Time: Reuters gives 1245 GMT.

    Our record: evt-2026-04-17-001

    BOE Report / Reuters, Apr 17, 2026

  3. Report published ·

    Reuters: “Traders place $760 million bet on falling oil ahead of Hormuz announcement”

    BOE Report / Reuters, Apr 17, 2026

Status as of Oct 19, 2026

Rep. Ritchie Torres asked the CFTC on Apr 17 to expand its review to this trade. ABC News reported on May 7 that it is one of four trades the Justice Department and CFTC are examining. No charges or findings published as of Oct 19, 2026.

Apr 21, 2026 · Ceasefire extension statement

  1. Reported trade window ·

    Brent crude futures: 4,260 lots of selling, worth a combined $430 million

    As reported: between 1954 and 1956 GMT on Tuesday

    Reported by Reuters (LSEG data)

    The Standard (HK) / Reuters, Apr 23, 2026

  2. Official announcement ·

    Donald Trump

    Trump said he would extend the ceasefire until Iran submitted a unified proposal and discussions concluded, while keeping the naval blockade in place.

    Time: Reuters gives 2010 GMT.

    Our record: evt-2026-04-21-001, clm-2026-04-21-001

    “Based on the fact that the Government of Iran is seriously fractured ... we have been asked to hold our Attack on the Country of Iran until such time as their leaders and representatives can come up with a unified proposal” — Donald Trump, Truth Social

    The Standard (HK) / Reuters, Apr 23, 2026

  3. Report published ·

    Reuters: “Traders place US$430 million bet on lower oil price before Trump ceasefire extension”

    The Standard (HK) / Reuters, Apr 23, 2026

Responses on record

Status as of Oct 19, 2026

ABC News reported on May 7 that this is one of four trades the Justice Department and CFTC are examining. No charges or findings published as of Oct 19, 2026.

May 6, 2026 · Axios report on a one-page memorandum

  1. Reported trade window ·

    front-month Brent and WTI contracts: more than $700 million

    As reported: between 3:42 and 3:47 a.m. ET

    Reported by The Wall Street Journal (as cited in a May 27 letter from five senators)

    “more than $700 million worth of front-month Brent and WTI contracts were traded. These trades occurred between 3:42 and 3:47 a.m. ET.” — Sens. Warnock, Klobuchar, Slotkin, Booker and Luján, letter to the CFTC

    Office of Sen. Raphael Warnock, May 27, 2026

  2. Media report ·

    Axios (Barak Ravid)

    Axios reported that the U.S. and Iran were close to a one-page memorandum of understanding to end the war. Brent fell as much as 11.9% that morning. An Iranian parliamentary spokesman called the report "Americans' wish list".

    Time: Business Insider gives 4:50 a.m. ET for the Axios report.

    Business Insider (via Yahoo Finance), May 6, 2026

  3. Report published ·

    The Wall Street Journal: “Another Well-Timed Oil Trade Ahead of Iran News Raises Eyebrows”

    Office of Sen. Raphael Warnock (letter citing the WSJ), May 27, 2026

Responses on record

Status as of Oct 19, 2026

Five senators asked the CFTC on May 27 to investigate, report publicly and brief staff by Jun 15; no reply has been published. No regulator has said whether this trade is under review. No charges or findings published as of Oct 19, 2026.

Letters, probes and statements
  • Mar 24, 2026 White House (internal email to staff). An internal email reminded staff not to bet on prediction markets such as Kalshi and Polymarket using nonpublic information. First reported by The Wall Street Journal; CNN confirmed it on Apr 10. White House spokesman Davis Ingle said any suggestion that officials acted on such information without evidence was "baseless and irresponsible reporting".

    “is a very serious offense and will not be tolerated” — White House email to staff, Mar 24

    Covers: Strike postponement post (Mar 23, 2026)

    KEYT / CNN, Apr 10, 2026

  • Apr 8, 2026 Rep. Ritchie Torres (D-N.Y.). Letter asking the SEC and CFTC to investigate the March 23 oil futures trading, citing Reuters and The New Yorker.

    “textbook basis for insider trading and market manipulation concerns under federal securities and commodities laws” — Rep. Ritchie Torres, letter

    Covers: Strike postponement post (Mar 23, 2026)

    Office of Rep. Ritchie Torres, Apr 8, 2026

  • Apr 10, 2026 Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Sheldon Whitehouse. Letter to CFTC Chairman Michael Selig asking whether the Division of Enforcement has opened an investigation into the March 23 and April 7 oil futures trading, citing CBS News, CNBC and Reuters.

    “raises serious questions about whether there has been recurring misappropriation of material nonpublic government information” — Sens. Warren and Whitehouse, letter

    Response requested by Apr 30, 2026

    Covers: Strike postponement post (Mar 23, 2026); Two-week ceasefire announcement (Apr 7, 2026)

    Senate Banking Committee (minority), Apr 10, 2026Senate Banking Committee (minority), Apr 10, 2026

  • Apr 14, 2026 Rep. Ritchie Torres (D-N.Y.). Letter to SEC Chair Paul Atkins and CFTC Chair Michael Selig asking them to investigate the April 7 trade reported by Reuters.

    Covers: Two-week ceasefire announcement (Apr 7, 2026)

    Office of Rep. Ritchie Torres, Apr 14, 2026

  • Apr 15, 2026 CFTC (as reported by Reuters and Bloomberg). Reuters and Bloomberg, each citing people familiar with the matter, reported that the CFTC is examining the March 23 and April 7 oil futures trades and has asked CME Group and ICE for data, including the identities of the entities behind the trades. A CFTC spokesperson declined to comment. CME Group said it "vigorously" surveils its markets.

    “we will find you, and you will face the full force of the law” — CFTC Chairman Michael Selig, prepared remarks for Congress

    Covers: Strike postponement post (Mar 23, 2026); Two-week ceasefire announcement (Apr 7, 2026)

    WDEZ / Reuters, Apr 15, 2026Bloomberg Law / Bloomberg News, Apr 15, 2026

  • Apr 16, 2026 CFTC Chairman Michael Selig, House Agriculture Committee testimony. Selig said the agency had "numerous investigations ongoing" and would not confirm any specific probe.

    “We're actively policing and surveilling these markets” — Michael Selig

    Covers: Strike postponement post (Mar 23, 2026); Two-week ceasefire announcement (Apr 7, 2026)

    S&P Global Commodity Insights, Apr 16, 2026

  • Apr 17, 2026 Rep. Ritchie Torres (D-N.Y.). Letter asking the CFTC to expand its review to the April 17 trade.

    “I write to request that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) immediately expand its ongoing investigation” — Rep. Ritchie Torres, letter

    Covers: Hormuz "completely open" post (Apr 17, 2026)

    Office of Rep. Ritchie Torres, Apr 20, 2026

  • May 7, 2026 Justice Department and CFTC (as reported by ABC News). ABC News, citing sources, reported that the Justice Department and the CFTC are examining at least four oil trades, on March 23, April 7, April 17 and April 21, using LSEG data. ABC noted the data does not identify the traders. Neither agency commented.

    “more than $2.6 billion was wagered on oil prices falling shortly before they did” — ABC News

    Covers: Strike postponement post (Mar 23, 2026); Two-week ceasefire announcement (Apr 7, 2026); Hormuz "completely open" post (Apr 17, 2026); Ceasefire extension statement (Apr 21, 2026)

    ABC7 / ABC News, May 7, 2026

  • May 27, 2026 Sens. Raphael Warnock, Amy Klobuchar, Elissa Slotkin, Cory Booker and Ben Ray Luján. Letter to CFTC Chairman Michael Selig asking for a prompt investigation, a public report on whether manipulation or misuse of nonpublic information occurred, and a bipartisan staff briefing.

    Response requested by Jun 15, 2026

    Covers: Strike postponement post (Mar 23, 2026); Two-week ceasefire announcement (Apr 7, 2026); Axios report on a one-page memorandum (May 6, 2026)

    Office of Sen. Raphael Warnock, May 27, 2026

  • Oct 13, 2026 CFTC (as reported by Bloomberg). Bloomberg reported that CFTC analysts sent a referral on the March 23 trades to the enforcement division, that an adviser to Chairman Selig had it withdrawn and took over the review, and that the enforcement division is still examining the trading. The CFTC declined to comment to Bloomberg.

    Covers: Strike postponement post (Mar 23, 2026)

    The New Republic (citing Bloomberg), Oct 13, 2026Bloomberg, Oct 13, 2026

Sizes and windows are copied as each outlet reported them; where outlets measured the same minutes differently, each measurement is listed. Clock times are shown in New York time with UTC. Editorial file: data/manual/headlines.yaml.

THE HARDWARE BILL

Updated weekly. Totals from different sources are not additive.

Week of Oct 19, 2026Checked against sources Oct 19, 2026

Updated weekly. Totals from different sources are not additive.

United States

What is countedFigureEvidenceDatesSource
U.S. aircraft lost or damaged (crewed and uncrewed)Fixed-wing, rotary-wing and uncrewed aircraft reported lost or damaged since Feb 28: about 63 destroyed or lost, 17 damaged, 1 status unclear. Includes enemy fire, friendly fire (three F-15Es over Kuwait), combat-zone mishaps, aircraft hit on the ground, and aircraft destroyed by U.S. forces during a rescue (two MC-130Js, four AH-6s). Includes at least 45 MQ-9s.81 aircraftIndependently reportedas of Sep 17, 2026CRS gives no cut-off date; Sep 17 is the latest dated entry in its table.published Oct 5, 2026

A compilation of news reports, CENTCOM/DoD statements and the Lead IG report, described by CRS as "reportedly" lost or damaged; some figures rest on anonymous officials. Some damaged aircraft (eight F-15Es, KC-135s) have returned to service. The May 13 edition of the same report counted 42. Does not cover personnel killed or wounded.

U.S. crewed aircraft destroyed or damagedCrewed airframes in Lead IG Table 5: four F-15E, one F-35A, one A-10, seven KC-135, one E-3, one HH-60W, four AH-6, one AH-64, one MH-60. Destroyed and damaged are not separated in this count.21 airframesOfficially acknowledgedas of Jun 30, 2026published Sep 9, 2026

Covers Feb 28 – Jun 30 only, so it is lower than later tallies. The PDF could not be opened from our sandbox; the figures are as read from Table 5 by DroneXL. published_at is the PDF's posting date in its URL.

U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones destroyedMQ-9s "destroyed in various circumstances" (Lead IG Table 5: "As many as 30").up to 30 MQ-9sOfficially acknowledgedas of Jun 30, 2026published Sep 9, 2026

Covers Feb 28 – Jun 30. Causes are not separated (enemy fire, mishap, other).

U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones lostMQ-9s lost since Feb 28, per U.S. officials; reported as roughly a quarter of the pre-war fleet.at least 45 MQ-9sIndependently reportedas of Aug 13, 2026No cut-off given; dated to the Washington Post report.published Aug 13, 2026

Anonymous U.S. officials speaking to The Washington Post (Aug 13); the Post itself could not be opened from our sandbox (robots). CRS uses this figure in its 81-aircraft count.

U.S. MQ-9 drones Iran says it shot downIran's running count of MQ-9s it says it downed; the Sep 16 claim was announced as the "52nd".52 MQ-9sClaimed by Iran (IRGC, via Tasnim)as of Sep 16, 2026published Sep 16, 2026

Headline wording only ("IRGC downs 52nd US MQ-9 drone south of Iran"); the article body could not be retrieved. Not confirmed by the U.S.

Structures and equipment damaged or destroyed at U.S. military sites217 structures and 11 pieces of equipment at 15 U.S. military sites in the region, identified in 109 verified Iranian-released images plus Planet satellite imagery (19 images excluded as inconclusive). Includes an E-3 and a tanker at Prince Sultan AB, THAAD radars and equipment, Patriot equipment, radomes and satellite dishes.at least 228 structures or pieces of equipmentVisually documentedas of Apr 14, 2026published May 6, 2026

Damage visible in imagery only. CENTCOM declined to address the findings; a military spokesperson said "assessments of destruction are complex and can be misleading in some cases."

Damaged structures at U.S. bases examined by CSISStructures CSIS examined in overhead imagery for its base-repair estimate.122 structuresVisually documentedas of Jun 23, 2026No imagery cut-off given; dated to publication.published Jun 23, 2026

A separate count from the Post's 228; CSIS says restricted imagery means it is incomplete.

THAAD radar destroyed at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, JordanOne THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar, destroyed early in the war, per U.S. officials and satellite imagery.1 radarIndependently reportedas of Mar 7, 2026published Mar 7, 2026

Unnamed U.S. officials to CNN; not confirmed on the record at the time. CBO's Sep 15 letter later cites "a THAAD radar destroyed by Iran" as a battle loss (see us-equipment-cost-cbo).

Cost of U.S. equipment losses (CBO)Battle losses DoD would have to change its plans to replace (e.g. a THAAD radar, aircraft). The high end assumes DoD seeks supplemental funding for all battle losses. Aircraft already due for replacement count nothing (no cost for the four F-15Es).$1.9–3.3 billionOfficially acknowledgedas of Aug 1, 2026published Sep 15, 2026

A CBO estimate (U.S. government, legislative branch), not a DoD figure. Excludes base and facility repairs, which CBO says it cannot estimate.

Cost of U.S. equipment losses (Lead IG)Equipment losses within the $33.4 billion war cost reported to the Lead IG.$3.7 billionOfficially acknowledgedas of Jun 29, 2026published Sep 9, 2026

Excludes infrastructure repairs. Figure as read by DroneXL; the PDF could not be opened from our sandbox.

Cost of U.S. equipment losses and damage (CSIS)Mostly aircraft (the 42 in CRS's May count plus several tilt-rotors and a mobile THAAD radar). High end: one-for-one replacement; low end excludes aircraft due for retirement (A-10, E-3). Repairs assumed at 25–75% of replacement cost.$1.8–3.5 billionIndependently reportedas of Jun 23, 2026No cut-off given; dated to publication.published Jun 23, 2026

Think-tank estimate. Base equipment is counted under base damage, not here.

Cost of repairing damage at U.S. bases (CSIS)Repair cost scaled to the Washington Post's 228 damaged structures, from DoD construction handbooks; CSIS's own 122 structures come to $2.2–5.1 billion.$4–9.4 billionIndependently reportedas of Jun 23, 2026No cut-off given; dated to publication.published Jun 23, 2026

Visible damage only; CSIS says the real cost will be higher. DoD has not published base repair costs.

  • U.S. Navy ships damaged: no published total. No officially acknowledged or independently documented total. CENTCOM denied Iran's claim of a missile strike on USS Abraham Lincoln (Mar 1: "The Lincoln was not hit") and said neither destroyer was struck in the May 4 Hormuz transit (USS Truxtun, USS Mason).

Allied and commercial

  • Allied and commercial ships damaged: no published total. No single published total located. Individual ship incidents are in the corpus (event_type SHIP_INCIDENT).

Israel

  • Israeli aircraft, drones and equipment lost: no published total. No IDF-acknowledged or independently compiled total for the 2026 war located.

Iran — figures claimed by the U.S. and Israel

What is countedFigureEvidenceDatesSource
Iranian ships sunkIranian ships that "are at the bottom of the ocean," per Gen. Caine at the Apr 8 Pentagon briefing. He said only half of the IRGC's small attack boats had been sunk.150 shipsClaimed by U.S. (Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs)as of Apr 8, 2026published Apr 10, 2026

Officials and analysts told the Washington Post the Apr 8 claims may be overstated (Defense One).

Iranian vessels destroyed or damagedIranian vessels destroyed or damaged since the start of operations, per CENTCOM. No breakdown by type or by destroyed vs damaged.more than 155 vesselsClaimed by U.S. (CENTCOM)as of Apr 6, 2026published Apr 6, 2026

Outlet paraphrase; no primary CENTCOM release located. Earlier CENTCOM figures were "over 100" (Mar 16) and "more than 140" (Mar 24).

Iranian air-defense targets struckAir-defense targets struck (not confirmed destroyed), per Gen. Caine on Apr 8. Caine said "All of these systems are gone."more than 1,500 targetsClaimed by U.S. (Gen. Dan Caine, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs)as of Apr 8, 2026published Apr 10, 2026

Targets are strike aimpoints, not a count of systems.

Share of Iran's missile launchers neutralizedLaunchers "neutralized" ("some destroyed and others rendered unusable"), per Israeli military assessments; officials estimated 100–200 launchers still active.more than 60 percent of launchersClaimed by Israel (Israeli military assessments, unnamed officials)as of Mar 6, 2026published Mar 6, 2026

Early-war figure; no later IDF total located. U.S. intelligence later assessed roughly half of launchers intact (reported, undated).

  • Iranian aircraft destroyed: no published total. No U.S. or Israeli cumulative claim located.

Each row is one published figure from one source, with the source's own hedge (“at least”, “up to”). Rows overlap and are never added together; where no source publishes a total, the category is listed as a gap rather than estimated.

Last change Oct 19, 2026: First edition.

Full ledger and methodology →

ALSO ON FILE

Same ledger, different angles.

THE GRAVEYARD

A brief history of hope.

11 breakthroughs · median lifespan 13 days · survivors 0

  1. R.I.P.

    The 15-Point Plan

    Mar 25 – Apr 8

    14 days

    Nice try.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-03-25-001 · DEAL_FRAMEWORK · US 15-point plan delivered to Iran via Pakistan; Tehran publicly denies talks
    Died:
    evt-2026-04-08-001 · CEASEFIRE_BROKEN (severity 4) · Israel launches mass strikes on Lebanon; Netanyahu says ceasefire 'does not include Lebanon'
    Lifespan:
    2026-04-08 − 2026-03-25 = 14 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  2. R.I.P.

    Two-Week Ceasefire

    Apr 7 – Apr 8

    1 day

    Two weeks, roughly.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-04-07-001 · CEASEFIRE_REACHED · Trump announces two-week ceasefire with Iran, brokered by Pakistan, conditioned on Hormuz reopening
    Died:
    evt-2026-04-08-001 · CEASEFIRE_BROKEN (severity 4) · Israel launches mass strikes on Lebanon; Netanyahu says ceasefire 'does not include Lebanon'
    Lifespan:
    2026-04-08 − 2026-04-07 = 1 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  3. R.I.P.

    Israel–Lebanon 10-Day Truce

    Apr 16 – May 7

    21 days

    Outlived its warranty.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-04-16-001 · CEASEFIRE_REACHED · Israel and Lebanon agree 10-day ceasefire announced by Trump
    Died:
    evt-2026-05-07-001 · RETALIATION (severity 4) · Iran attacks three U.S. destroyers in Hormuz; U.S. strikes back
    Died source:
    CNBC, 2026-05-07
    Lifespan:
    2026-05-07 − 2026-04-16 = 21 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  4. R.I.P.

    The Indefinite Ceasefire

    Apr 21 – May 7

    16 days

    Indefinite, it turns out, is 16.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-04-21-001 · CEASEFIRE_REACHED · Trump extends Iran ceasefire indefinitely 'until discussions are concluded'; blockade continues
    Born source:
    Axios, 2026-04-21
    Born source:
    NPR, 2026-04-21
    Died:
    evt-2026-05-07-001 · RETALIATION (severity 4) · Iran attacks three U.S. destroyers in Hormuz; U.S. strikes back
    Died source:
    CNBC, 2026-05-07
    Lifespan:
    2026-05-07 − 2026-04-21 = 16 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  5. R.I.P.

    “Largely Negotiated”

    May 23 – Jun 5

    13 days

    Largely.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-05-23-001 · DEAL_FRAMEWORK · Trump says Iran deal 'largely negotiated'
    Born source:
    NPR, 2026-05-23
    Died:
    evt-2026-06-05-001 · RETALIATION (severity 4) · Iran fires drones at Hormuz and seven ballistic missiles at Kuwait and Bahrain
    Died source:
    CENTCOM, 2026-06-05
    Lifespan:
    2026-06-05 − 2026-05-23 = 13 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  6. R.I.P.

    Islamabad MOU Text

    Jun 12 – Jun 26

    14 days

    Never been closer.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-06-12-001 · DEAL_FRAMEWORK · Araghchi: Islamabad MOU 'has never been closer'; text reportedly agreed
    Died:
    evt-2026-06-26-001 · STRIKE (severity 4) · U.S. strikes Iranian missile, drone and radar sites after ship attack
    Died source:
    NPR, 2026-06-26
    Lifespan:
    2026-06-26 − 2026-06-12 = 14 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  7. R.I.P.

    The Deal, “Complete”

    Jun 14 – Jun 26

    12 days

    Complete-ish.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-06-14-001 · DEAL_REACHED · Trump declares Iran deal 'complete,' orders blockade lifted
    Born source:
    NPR, 2026-06-14
    Died:
    evt-2026-06-26-001 · STRIKE (severity 4) · U.S. strikes Iranian missile, drone and radar sites after ship attack
    Died source:
    NPR, 2026-06-26
    Lifespan:
    2026-06-26 − 2026-06-14 = 12 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  8. R.I.P.

    Islamabad Memorandum

    Jun 17 – Jun 26

    9 days

    Signed. Sealed.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-06-17-001 · DEAL_REACHED · Trump and Pezeshkian sign Islamabad Memorandum (Versailles / Tehran)
    Died:
    evt-2026-06-26-001 · STRIKE (severity 4) · U.S. strikes Iranian missile, drone and radar sites after ship attack
    Died source:
    NPR, 2026-06-26
    Lifespan:
    2026-06-26 − 2026-06-17 = 9 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  9. R.I.P.

    The Doha Stand-Down

    Jun 28 – Jul 7

    9 days

    “For now.”

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-06-28-001 · CEASEFIRE_REACHED · U.S. and Iran agree to halt strikes, meet in Doha
    Born source:
    Axios, 2026-06-28
    Died:
    evt-2026-07-07-002 · STRIKE (severity 5) · U.S. strikes ~80 Iranian targets including 60+ IRGC small boats
    Died source:
    CENTCOM, 2026-07-08
    Died source:
    CNBC, 2026-07-07
    Lifespan:
    2026-07-07 − 2026-06-28 = 9 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  10. R.I.P.

    The Called-Off Attack

    Aug 1 – Aug 17

    16 days

    Rapidly.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-08-01-001 · DEAL_FRAMEWORK · Trump cancels planned 'massive attack' on Iran, citing rapid deal on Hormuz
    Born source:
    JINSA, 2026-08-03
    Born source:
    NPR, 2026-08-02
    Died:
    evt-2026-08-17-001 · DEAL_DEAD · 60-day MOU negotiation deadline expires with no deal; Trump threatens to bomb Oman
    Died source:
    CNN, 2026-08-17
    Died source:
    JINSA, 2026-08-19
    Lifespan:
    2026-08-17 − 2026-08-01 = 16 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  11. R.I.P.

    The 60-Day Corridor

    Aug 4 – Aug 17

    13 days

    60 days, minus 47.

    Receipts
    Born:
    evt-2026-08-04-001 · DEAL_FRAMEWORK · Axios: US, Iran, Oman near 60-day Hormuz corridor arrangement; Iran said to approve
    Born source:
    JINSA, 2026-08-05
    Born source:
    CNN, 2026-08-04
    Born source:
    CNBC, 2026-08-05
    Died:
    evt-2026-08-17-001 · DEAL_DEAD · 60-day MOU negotiation deadline expires with no deal; Trump threatens to bomb Oman
    Died source:
    CNN, 2026-08-17
    Died source:
    JINSA, 2026-08-19
    Lifespan:
    2026-08-17 − 2026-08-04 = 13 (M2, calendar days, America/New_York)
  12. RESERVED

    for whatever gets announced next.

Lifespan runs from a deal, framework or ceasefire to the first collapse, broken ceasefire, called-off talks, or strike/retaliation of severity 4+ (M2). Every stone links to both events.

DERIVED methodology v1

How this is computed
derived.breakthroughs
M2. Every DEAL_REACHED/DEAL_FRAMEWORK/CEASEFIRE_REACHED event. Death = first strictly-later DEAL_DEAD, CEASEFIRE_BROKEN, TALKS_OFF event, or STRIKE/RETALIATION with severity ≥ 4. lifespan_days = death date − birth date (calendar days, America/New_York); for operating breakthroughs, age as of 2026-10-19.
inputs (17): evt-2026-03-25-001, evt-2026-04-07-001, evt-2026-04-08-001, evt-2026-04-16-001, evt-2026-04-21-001, evt-2026-05-07-001, evt-2026-05-23-001, evt-2026-06-05-001, evt-2026-06-12-001, evt-2026-06-14-001, evt-2026-06-17-001, evt-2026-06-26-001, evt-2026-06-28-001, evt-2026-07-07-002, evt-2026-08-01-001, evt-2026-08-04-001, evt-2026-08-17-001
calculated 2026-10-19T15:33:17.537Z